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Case Comment
Freeing Newsgathering from the
Reporter's Privilege
McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
A number of recent high-profile cases have forced courts to reexamine
whether reporters must respond to subpoenas seeking disclosure of
confidential sources or whether they are protected from doing so by the
doctrine of reporter's privilege.' While these confidential-source cases have
garnered the most public attention, the vast majority of subpoenas issued to
reporters seek to compel disclosure of nonconfidential information.2 In a
recent case, McKevitt v. Pallasch, Judge Posner suggests that the reporter's
privilege, if it exists at all, should not extend to nonconfidential
information. In this Comment, I argue that Posner overlooks the unique
ways in which a privilege for nonconfidential information protects the
newsgathering process. Federal courts should use their common law power
under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 to articulate a flexible newsgathering
privilege for reporters analogous to the work product immunity that exists
for attorneys.4
1. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding
the district court's contempt ruling against reporters who refused to comply with a grand jury
subpoena in an investigation into the leak of Valerie Plame's status as a CIA operative); Lee v.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, 327 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding reporters in contempt for
refusing to comply with a subpoena issued in Wen Ho Lee's civil suit against the government).
2. THE REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, AGENTS OF DISCOVERY: A REPORT
ON THE INCIDENCE OF SUBPOENAS SERVED ON THE NEWS MEDIA IN 2001, at 8-9 (Lucy A.
Dalglish et al. eds., 2003).
3. 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
4. Courts are divided on this issue. For example, the three-judge panel that heard In re Grand
Jury Subpoena (Miller), which involved a confidential source, filed three separate concurrences
on the issue of a common law privilege. Judge Sentelle would have held that there is no common
law privilege, Judge Tatel would have held that there is, and Judge Henderson thought the court
should not reach the question. In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 397 F.3d at 973.
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In McKevitt, a defendant in a terrorism case in Ireland obtained a U.S.
district court order compelling a group of biographers to produce
videotapes of an interview with a key prosecution witness. The witness did
not object to the disclosure of the tapes, and his identity had not been kept
confidential. Nevertheless, the biographers appealed the order on the basis
of a claimed federal common law reporter's privilege rooted in the First
Amendment. In refusing to issue a stay, the Seventh Circuit held that
subpoenas of reporters deserve no special treatment and should be subject
to the reasonableness test applied to all subpoenas. 5
McKevitt evinces the commonly held view that a privilege for
nonconfidential information is merely an expansion of the privilege for
confidential sources sanctioned by Branzburg v. Hayes.6 Within the First
Amendment framework of Branzburg, the absence of confidentiality
weakens the claim to privilege: "When the information in the reporter's
possession does not come from a confidential source, it is difficult to see
what possible bearing the First Amendment could have on the question of
compelled disclosure. 7
However, as Judge Posner acknowledges, the First Amendment is not
the only possible source of protection for newsgathering activities.8 The
Federal Rules of Evidence invite courts to consider recognizing new
evidentiary privileges according to "the principles of the common law...
in the light of reason and experience." 9 In recognizing privileges, courts
look, among other things, to state common law and state statutes. 10 With
more than twenty states offering protection for nonconfidential
information-in the form of shield laws or case law-a prima facie case
exists for recognizing a common law privilege for newsgathering."
5. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 531-33.
6. 408 U.S. 665, 679-80 (1972). The Branzburg Court held, however, that this privilege was
overcome in grand jury proceedings. In a concurrence, Justice Powell, the decisive fifth vote,
argued for a balancing test and case-by-case determination of the privilege. Id. at 709 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
7. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 533.
8. Id. at 532.
9. FED. R. EvID. 501.
10. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12 (1996) ("That it is appropriate for the federal
courts to recognize a psychotherapist privilege under Rule 501 is confirmed by the fact that all 50
States and the District of Columbia have enacted into law some form of psychotherapist
privilege."); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-50 (1980) (examining the evolution of
state practices in reviewing the testimonial privilege for spouses).
11. See Anthony L. Fargo, The Journalist's Privilege for Nonconfidential Information in
States Without Shield Laws, 7 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 241, 255-57 (2002). See generally Robert D.
Lystad & Malena F. Barzilai, Reporter's Privilege: Legislative and Regulatory Developments,
MEDIA L. RESOURCE CENTER BULL., Aug. 2004, at 83, 133-43 (White Paper on the Reporter's
Privilege).
Ten federal circuits have recognized a qualified reporter's privilege preventing disclosure of
confidential and, in some cases, nonconfidential information. Kelli L. Sager et al., The Road Less
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In McKevitt, Posner discards those arguments advanced in support of a
nonconfidential-information privilege as "skating on thin ice," because they
were rejected in Branzburg in the context of a confidential-source
privilege.12 However, rejecting certain interests as not protected by the First
Amendment does not foreclose their adoption for Rule 501 analysis.13
II
The McKevitt opinion rests on a failure, common among courts, to
adequately distinguish between the newsgathering process generally and the
journalist's relationship to a confidential source. These very different
aspects of the journalistic enterprise cannot be conceptualized in the same
way, nor should they be protected by the same privilege. Judge Posner is
correct to criticize proponents of a newsgathering privilege for attempting
to stretch Branzburg too far. Courts that have recognized such a privilege
have conflated newsgathering and source identity, rather than properly
recognizing that the rationale of Branzburg reaches only protections for
confidential sources. By justifying the nonconfidential-information
privilege in general terms that apply equally to the confidential-source
privilege, even its defenders have left it susceptible to outright rejection by
unsympathetic judges and relegated newsgathering to a secondary status.14
In order to recognize a newsgathering privilege, courts must articulate
justifications based on the distinct and important newsgathering interests at
Taken: The Path to Recognition of a Qualified Reporter's Privilege Through the Law of
Evidentiary Privileges, MEDIA L. RESOURCE CENTER BULL., Aug. 2004, at 1, 21 n.40 (White
Paper on the Reporter's Privilege); see also Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993)
(describing the status of the privilege in other circuits); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d
139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980) (recognizing a privilege for nonconfidential information); Anthony L.
Fargo, Reconsidering the Federal Journalist's Privilege for Non-Confidential Information:
Gonzales v. NBC, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 355, 372 (2001) (outlining the circuit courts'
rationales for a privilege for nonconfidential information, namely, "(1) protecting the free flow of
information to the public; (2) protecting the autonomy, or independence, of the press; and
(3) protecting the press from undue burdens on time and resources caused by the threat of an
unchecked flood of subpoenas").
12. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 533.
13. See Sager et al., supra note 11, at 6 n.3 (articulating the difference between recognition of
the privilege under First Amendment jurisprudence and under privilege law).
14. In recognizing a reporter's privilege for nonconfidential information, the Second Circuit
relied on the same rationale used to justify a confidential-source privilege: a "paramount public
interest in the maintenance of a vigorous, aggressive and independent press capable of
participating in robust, unfettered debate over controversial matters." Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d
29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). But cf United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d
963, 969 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting a reporter's arguments to extend reporter's privilege to
"nonconfidential work product").
In 1972, the House Judiciary Committee considered but never adopted a bill to privilege
journalists' work product. Newsmen's Privilege: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 150, 204-09 (1972). However, this proposal was cast as
expanding the proposed confidential-source privilege rather than creating a separate source of
protection and thus failed to address the contours of an independent privilege. Id.
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stake. A newsgathering privilege should stand on independent footing from
the confidential-source privilege just as the work product doctrine has a
distinct basis from the attorney-client privilege. Constitutional interests in
effective representation necessitate these two complementary protections
for attorneys. Similarly, newsgathering and confidential-source protections
bolster different aspects of a free press.
The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest common law
privileges, rooted in the need for effective representation. The privilege is
based on a need for "full and frank communication between attorneys and
their clients."' 5 Work product immunity was first recognized by the
Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor 6 and was later codified in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 17 The rationale that Hickman articulated is that
preparation for vigorous advocacy in an adversarial system requires
"privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their
counsel."1 8 These complementary and somewhat overlapping protections
guard different types of interests within the attorney-client relationship and
thus have distinct shapes.
The analogy between attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine illustrates the discrete incentives protected by the confidential-
source privilege and the newsgathering privilege. The attorney-client
privilege seeks to encourage disclosure of information within the protected
relationship,' 9  as does confidential-source protection.2° Without the
assurance of confidentiality, clients would not disclose certain types of
information to their attorneys. Similarly, the confidential-source privilege
facilitates disclosure to journalists of information that sources would not
disclose without identity protection. A further illustration of the centrality
of disclosure incentives to the attorney-client and confidential-source
privileges is that both privileges can be waived by the party external to the
protected institution: the client or the source.21
In contrast, work product immunity and the newsgathering privilege
protect the lawyer's and the journalist's discretion in performing their
15. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
16. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
18. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11.
19. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) ("The purpose of the [attorney-
client] privilege is to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys."); Hunt v.
Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (stating that the attomey-client privilege is founded on the
need for assistance, which "can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the
consequences or the apprehension of disclosure").
20. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679-80 (1972) (recognizing reporters' claim "that
if the reporter is... forced to reveal these confidences to a grand jury, the source so identified and
other confidential sources of other reporters will be measurably deterred from furnishing
publishable information").
21. A source can effectively waive her protection of confidentiality by publicly disclosing her
identity. Nevertheless, as the facts of McKevitt illustrate, this disclosure does not waive the
journalist's claim of privilege.
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respective duties.2 Failure to protect the preparation stage in both processes
damages the underlying institutions in ways that go beyond the ordinary
inconvenience of responding to a subpoena. In recognizing work product
immunity, Hickman focused on the adversarial nature of the justice system.
Work product disclosure would undermine the adversarial system, requiring
lawyers to turn over to opponents their strategies and views on the
weaknesses of their cases.13 To avoid doing this, attorneys would self-
censor and eschew certain strategies, causing clients' interests to suffer.
The press also exists in a type of adversarial relationship that requires
preserving the integrity of its internal processes. The press serves as an
institutional check on governmental and other abuses.24 Thus, preserving
the checking value of the press demands protections mirroring those for
attorney work product. Disclosure of the interim steps in newsgathering
may result in self-censorship: "[I]nternal policies of destruction of materials
may be devised and choices as to subject matter made .... ,,2 The specter
of forced disclosure leads to a form of covert and creeping censorship. For
similar reasons, the Court has deemed editorial discretion and subject
matter choice central to the integrity of a free press. 26 To the extent that
resource materials, drafts, and outtakes reveal the editorial choices made by
the press, they should be protected. 7
Thus, protections for confidential sources and for newsgathering are
rooted in different theoriesof a free press. The confidential-source privilege
shields the free flow of information, while the newsgathering privilege
22. In Herbert v. Lando, the Second Circuit articulated the importance of editorial discretion:
If we were to allow selective disclosure of how a journalist formulated his judgments
on what to print or not to print, we would be condoning judicial review of the editor's
thought processes. Such an inquiry, which on its face would be virtually boundless,
endangers a constitutionally protected realm, and unquestionably puts a freeze on the
free interchange of ideas within the newsroom. A reporter or editor, aware that his
thoughts might have to be justified in a court of law, would often be discouraged and
dissuaded from the creative verbal testing, probing, and discussion of hypotheses and
alternatives which are the sine qua non of responsible journalism.
568 F.2d 974, 980 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). The Supreme Court, overruling,
found that these interests were overcome in a libel action. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
In Hickman, the Supreme Court outlined a similar interest in allowing unfettered time for an
attorney to "assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant
facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy." Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
23. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11.
24. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521, 535-43, 591-611.
25. United States v. La Rouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (lst Cir. 1988) (upholding a
subpoena for nonconfidential information but acknowledging the public interests arrayed against
compelled disclosure).
26. E.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
27. Congress has recognized the importance of reporters' work product by singling out for
protection against searches and seizures "any work product materials possessed by a person
reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast,
or other similar form of public communication" or "documentary materials, other than work
product materials, possessed by a person in connection with" such a purpose, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000aa(a)-(b) (2000).
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ensures the independence and autonomy of the press. Both the
newsgathering privilege and the attorney work product doctrine guard the
internal processes related to the functioning of constitutionally protected
institutions. The work product doctrine protects the lawyer's "role in
assuring the proper functioning of the criminal justice system, '28 while the
newsgathering privilege acknowledges that the "freedom of the press can be
no broader than the freedom of reporters to investigate and report the
news." 29 The work product doctrine furthers the public policy interests in
both an adversarial justice system and the "fair and accurate resolution" of
disputes.3 ° Similarly, a newsgathering privilege promotes the autonomy of
the press required to serve as a check on government abuses31 as well as
society's interest in a newsgathering process free from intrusion.
As a consequence of these different interests, the attorney-client and
confidential-source privileges can be waived by the party external to these
protected institutions. Granting a source the power to waive the privilege
encourages disclosure to the press and public dissemination of information
by giving the source some level of control in the relationship. In contrast,
the newsgathering privilege is held internally in order to protect the
autonomy and integrity of the press from intrusion. Traditional Wigmorean
analysis is only suited to certain types of interests: It emphasizes
confidentiality interests and focuses on the relationships between protected
institutions and external sources. 32 This view underprotects the internal
process--editorial discretion-at stake in newsgathering. Thus, extending
the rationale of Branzburg will never appropriately address the distinct
interests protected by a newsgathering privilege.
III
Critics of expanding the reporter's privilege to include newsgathering
focus on the difficulties in shaping such a privilege.33 Conceptualizing
newsgathering as distinct from confidential-source relationships would
allow courts to craft a privilege tailored to the interests protected. A
28. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975).
29. Department of Justice Guidelines for Subpoenas Issued to the Press, 28 C.F.R. § 50.10
(2004) (requiring prosecutors to negotiate with the press before issuing a subpoena).
30. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238. Compare id. with Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11
(1947).
31. See Blasi, supra note 24, at 535-43, 591-611 (discussing the autonomy of the press and its
checking function).
32. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285, at 527 (John
T. McNaughton ed., 1961).
33. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller), 397 F.3d 964, 981 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(Sentelle, J., concurring) (outlining the "difficult policy questions" in recognizing a reporter's
privilege); Storer Commc'ns v. Giovan (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 810 F.2d 580, 584 (6th
Cir. 1987) (citing "the difficulties of administering such a privilege" in refusing to grant a
privilege for nonconfidential information).
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newsgathering privilege modeled on the attorney work product doctrine
could respond to the specific interests in newsgathering. The work product
doctrine provides a useful template for sketching out the contours of a
newsgathering privilege: the holder of the privilege, waiver requirements,
the scope of the privilege, and the standard for overcoming the privilege.
As attorneys hold work product immunity, so should reporters hold the
newsgathering privilege. This proposal is not unproblematic. The same
concerns about how to define who is a reporter that haunt the existing
privilege for confidential sources would apply to a newsgathering privilege
as well.34 Yet courts have resolved this dilemma in the body of case law
interpreting state shield laws and common law privileges.
35
Distinct waiver requirements for a newsgathering privilege should be
crafted to safeguard the complementary interests protected by the
newsgathering and confidential-source privileges. For instance, a client may
waive the attorney-client privilege on a particular matter, yet public policy
interests dictate that the attorney retain work product immunity on materials
related to the same issue.3 6 Similarly, in a case like McKevitt, a source may
effectively waive the confidential-source privilege by disclosing his or her
identity, yet the broader interests in a free press may argue for protecting
the reporter's notes and editorial processes through a newsgathering
privilege.31
The scope of any new privilege related to the press is likely to be
similar to the work product doctrine. The work product doctrine is, in some
senses, broader than its attorney-client-privilege counterpart;38 it is also
more easily overcome, by a showing of a "substantial need" for materials
that a party cannot obtain without "undue hardship. '39 Similarly, a
newsgathering privilege would be broader in scope but more easily
overcome than the qualified privilege afforded confidential sources in most
jurisdictions. In Gonzales v. NBC, the Second Circuit articulated such a
standard, with a qualified privilege for nonconfidential information more
easily overcome than the privilege for confidential sources.4 ° A party
seeking disclosure must show that there is a "likely relevance to a
34. For a discussion of the evolution of this problem, see 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5426, at 750-66 (1980 &
Supp. 2004).
35. See C. THOMAS DIENES ET AL., NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW 773-75 (2d ed. 1999)
(discussing the definitional issues in interpreting who is covered by state shield laws).
36. See, e.g., Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 156 (D. Del. 1977) ("Since the
attorney-client privilege is a client's privilege, while work product immunity may be invoked only
by an attorney, waiver of attorney-client privilege does not necessarily also waive work product
immunity .... ).
37. See also United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980) (upholding a
privilege for journalists' resource materials despite confidentiality waivers from sources).
38. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.11 (1975).
39. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3).
40. 194 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999).
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significant issue in the case, and [that such information is] not reasonably
obtainable from other available sources.",
4 1
The newsgathering privilege should also provide for a tiered structure
for different types of information similar to the distinction between ordinary
and opinion work product.42 Parties would face a higher burden before
obtaining certain types of information (e.g., research notes, prior drafts, or
editors' notes) that are central to the newsgathering process and a lower
burden for published materials and transcripts of interviews with
nonconfidential sources.43 Here, the body of case law on state shield laws
protecting unpublished information provides a useful model. A tiered
structure tailors protections to the interests vital to the newsgathering
process while limiting the concerns about granting sweeping immunity to
the press.44 This proposed privilege would likely have afforded additional
protection to the tape recordings at issue in McKevitt, requiring a showing
of more than mere reasonableness.
IV
McKevitt resonates with the widespread frustrations about the reporter's
privilege doctrine. A privilege for nonconfidential information is misplaced
under Branzburg's First Amendment framework. 45 A separate rationale for
newsgathering protection would create a distinct locus for that protection in
the federal common law like the separate basis for work product doctrine.
Freeing a newsgathering privilege from the confidential-source
privilege would afford more carefully tailored protections to the interests at
stake. Moreover, this separation would provide a stronger basis for Judge
Posner's intimations at possible future recognition of a federal common law
basis for the newsgathering privilege.46 Under this proposed separation of
privileges, the newsgathering privilege would likely have protected the
biographers in McKevitt from compelled disclosure or at least required a
stronger showing from the parties seeking subpoenas.
-Jaynie Randall
41. Id. at 36; see also In re Petrol. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1982)
(articulating the stricter standard for overcoming a confidential-source privilege).
42. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Opinion work product is that which reveals the mental
processes of the attorney, and it is absolutely protected from discovery; in contrast, ordinary work
product can be disclosed on a showing of undue hardship.
43. Compare the standards for protecting editorial materials in Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d
974 (2d Cir. 1977) (arguing for absolute protection for journalists' mental processes), rev'd,
441 U.S. 153 (1979), with those in Tofani v. State, 465 A.2d 413 (Md. 1983) (finding that a
reporter's interests in protecting sources were overcome when the names of sources had been
published).
44. For a discussion of the policy reasons favoring a nonconfidential-information privilege as
an extension of the existing reporter's privilege, see Fargo, supra note 11, at 271-73.
45. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 532.
46. Id.
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